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ETHICS: BEYOND THE RULES-
QUESTIONS AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES:.
Douglas N. Frenkel**
AS with most academic inquiries, audiences will likely read this
collection of essays with an eye toward its possible implications
for reform. In light of the consistency with which our lawyer-discus-
sants described the legal profession, it is tempting to react by identify-
ing specific institutional solutions to particular problems. Given the
preliminary and limited nature of the inquiry here, however, such a
search for solutions seems premature. Rather, the greatest contribu-
tion that this study offers is to yield exploratory data for the present
debates about reform of the legal profession, a fertile agenda for more
rigorous empirical inquiry as a prelude to possible change. Neverthe-
less, to stimulate such discussion, the following paragraphs will treat
our researchers' shared observations as "givens" and then discuss po-
tential responses in four major areas, together with attendant ques-
tions they may pose for those who regulate, manage, and educate
lawyers. This initial exploration should trigger the reader's own reac-
tions, questions, and criticisms.
I. IMPROVING THE LITIGATION PROCESS
Our observers' reports suggest that, barring a wholesale shift from
our basic adversary premise, minor changes in the rules of civil proce-
dure or codes governing the litigation conduct of lawyers are unlikely
to have much effect to the extent they attempt to address areas like
discovery abuse. The entrenched systemic and increasing environ-
mental pressures are too strong. What constitutes a "minor" shift in
the context of the voluminous literature on potential reforms in civil
procedure is a subject beyond the scope of this study or this essay.
Overall, however, "tinkering" will produce little change except, per-
haps, for providing new fodder for litigator gaming.
Moreover, given the cross-fire of attacks as to the identity of the
culprit in this sphere-for example, harassing plaintiffs versus file-
churning, document-concealing defense counsel-any remedy that
aims to ameliorate one problem may aggravate another. For example,
well-intended rules or judicial initiatives aimed at reducing the volume
of discovery, shortening its duration, or imposing and enforcing strict
deadlines on the process may exacerbate the main problem we stud-
* Reprinted by permission. © 1998 American Bar Association. All rights
reserved.
** Practice Professor of Lav and Clinical Director, University of Pennsylvania
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ied-non-disclosure of key information. In a similar vein, reforms
aimed at systemic efficiency, for example, court-imposed early ADR
procedures and other settlement pressures, may create new incentives
for defense counsel to maintain a strong, competitive, non-disclosing
posture in the early stages of litigation in order to maintain the upper
hand in settlement processes.
According to our reports, improvements in judicial control of the
discovery process hold the promise of considerable positive progress
in curbing discovery abuse. This, too, seems problematic; short of a
massive infusion of resources, however, appellate court support for
tough sanctions and an overall change in judicial mind-set and back-
bone in policing discovery may have limited effect. Additionally, as
with discovery rules, any initiative aimed at solving one problem may
have adverse side effects.'
Given what was said about the shift in litigation roles, the structure
of the lawyer-client relationship, and the demise of the outside law-
yer's counseling function occasioned by the rise of in-house counsel, it
may be fruitful to examine the way information, especially that con-
tained in documents, is produced in discovery. If such production is,
in reality, controlled within client entities rather than by defense
firms, should there be a movement to insuring that there be collabora-
tive inside-outside counsel discussion, if not certification, as to what is
produced and what is not? Similarly, if large-firm lawyers, especially
unmentored juniors, are increasingly working alone on key early
round discovery assignments, might the requirement of certification
by at least one senior and one junior firm member provide some im-
petus for intrafirm scrutiny and justification of non-disclosure deci-
sions or tough "default positions" in discovery?'
The litigation system was described as a prisoner's dilemma charac-
terized by spiraling mutually destructive aggression in matters per-
ceived as one-shot dealings between counsel. Where trust could be
earned by prior dealings or aggression tempered by the likelihood of
future interactions, however, the cycle might be moderated. Those
looking to reform litigation practice might consider ways of creating a
greater and more personal sense of a litigating community. This could
take the form of the judiciary's requiring more frequent face-to-face
("corporeal") encounters of counsel in the course of ongoing individ-
ual matters. In a similar vein, it may be fruitful to consider ways of
bringing corporate clients more directly, significantly, and continu-
ously into early stages of important case processing. In a world of
1. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evalua-
tion of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (1996) (noting
that early case management, which cuts case disposition time, may increase party liti-
gation costs).
2. This seems to have been the voluntary practice in some firms. See Lloyd N.
Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 Bus. Law. 1549, 1550 (1978).
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declining nonlegal advice by outside counsel, this could go part of the
way to insuring that the principals and counsel understand the stakes
and risks and, through direct participation, the strengths and real
agendas of all involved.
This line of thinking raises a myriad of questions. Before tackling
new discovery rules, for example, one might want harder data con-
cerning the kinds of cases in which discovery abuse is most likely to
occur and the form it might take. It would be useful to learn more
about the relationship of discovery deadlines, breadth, and monitoring
to other systemic goods like the quantity and quality of settlements.
In reforming judicial monitoring of litigation, and especially discovery
conduct, it would be important to learn, among other things, those
discovery control techniques that work best, whether elected judges
have weaker backbones in policing discovery than those selected on
the basis of merit, and whether and when the personal presence of
lawyers and/or parties makes a positive and cost effective difference in
curbing destructive adversariness. In regard to corporate conduct in
litigation, one would want to better measure whether the new counsel-
ing relationship, with in-house counsel screening outside counsel's de-
cisions, aggravates or moderates problems of hyperaggressiveness.
Are in-house counsel able to remain sufficiently independent of their
employers so as to be able to offer objective advice? Is client disinter-
est in moral advice an empirical reality or does the economic insecu-
rity of law firm litigants lead them to assume a technical, non-
counseling role -without asking?3
II. REGULATING/DISCIPLINING LAWYERS
Our observers' papers cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulating
the climate we studied through new rules for discipline of individual
lawyers. Such discipline tends to be rather private, rare in the seg-
ment of the bar we studied, limited by the scarce resources of enforce-
ment offices and confined to after-the-fact policing of conduct that has
clearly crossed the line. If it produces punishment of the worst "bad
apples" only, the discipline will not affect the symptoms our study
identified. Drafting meaningful rules for disciplinary purposes is hard
enough; codes that have fewer teeth, such as "civility codes," may
have an even weaker chance to make a difference.'
3. It is interesting to contrast our observers' reports with a well-known 1979
study of Chicago litigation departments, which reported that client pressures to block
sensitive discovery were usually resisted by outside counsel. See Wayne D. Brazil,
Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and
Abuses, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 787. As to lawyers' tendency to underestimate
clients' desires for lawyer intervention into (non-legal) business issues and to prefer
not to engage in non-legal advising, see Edward A. Daver, Role of the Lawyer: Attor-
neys Underestimate Client's Desire for Business Involvement, Sun'ey Shows, Preven-
tive L. Rep., Dec. 1988, at 19, 20.
4. Civility codes may be as or more effective than disciplinary rules.
1998]
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Codes of professional conduct will, of course, continue to occupy a
central focus of the profession's self-regulation.5 Our observers'
nearly unanimous reporting of the decline or absence of training or
mentoring of junior lawyers, the lack of horizontal monitoring of part-
ners, and the increase in large-firm lawyers working on their own indi-
cates that the disciplining of firms-rather than merely individuals-
may be worth a serious look in the current debate over rule reform.6
Current rules are directed at individual lawyers and focus on vertical,
supervisory relationships.7 The "culture" problems we heard about
were as much about the partnership level-especially with the advent
of laterals-as that of the inexperienced supervisee.8 Although such
rules directed at firms would not be without their limitations and
problems, they could have the effect of providing colleague-monitor-
ing incentives to those who wish to avoid vicarious responsibility for
unethical behavior of others in the firn. 9
Robert Nelson, a member of our research team, proposes relocating
a locus of responsibility for ethical standard-writing and monitoring to
firm or affinity subgroups in which lawyers work or affiliate.1" This
notion is intriguing and poses questions. Essentially, he suggests a
model for peer review of lawyers in which organized groups-plain-
tiffs' bar, associations of corporate counsel-or employers would cre-
ate formal standards of practice and evaluate their members for
competence and compliance." This method raises a host of questions
5. The ABA is currently engaged in a reexamination of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct through its "Ethics 2000" project.
6. See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell
L. Rev. 1 (1991) (using five highly-publicized incidents to provide insight into the
regulation of law firms). In 1996, New York became the first state to promulgate such
a rule. See N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (1998).
7. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 5.1 & 5.2 (1994).
8. Indeed, our reports suggest that it is the junior lawyers who were the more
sensitive, if not astute, among our informants, concerning professional responsibility
dilemmas. To the extent that this replicates the world of larger firms, it raises ques-
tions about whether the current rules serve the ends of encouraging fuller associate
communication about-if not responsibility for-decisions in this arena. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A
Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, 762 n.9 (1990). See
generally Carol M. Rice, The Superior Orders Defense in Legal Ethics: Sending the
Wrong Message to Young Lawyers, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 887 (1997) (arguing that
"every lawyer should consider and account for his professional conduct").
9. It is noteworthy that current trends, including the "LLP movement," seem to
be moving in the direction of limiting collective responsibility-at least for civil liabil-
ity-and, in the process, providing disincentives to police one's colleagues. See Susan
S. Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences-The Traps
of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 717, 733 (1997).
10. See Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institu-
tional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable,
Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 773, 806
(1998).
11. See id. If such groups were composed of large numbers of lawyers who regu-
larly opposed one another in specific substantive areas, such a proposal might have
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concerning remedies or sanctions for noncompliance, especially vis-A-
vis practice licensure. It also raises the prospect of the escalation of
ideological warfare through the exercise of this new function by gate-
keeper groups.
Finally, if it is true that financial insecurity leads lawyers to ethical
temptation and that "firms that can afford it are ethical," questions
are raised about current rules that may impede firms' ability to maxi-
mize their financial, managerial, or supervisory strengths. Controver-
sial as they are on other grounds, rules concerning the provision of
"law-related" or "ancillary" services, 12 and non-lawyer ownership or
control of a law practice, 13 may look different when viewed in this
light.
The wisdom of using the system of rule-based regulation to impact
lawyer conduct turns in part on comparing traditional lawyer disci-
pline, which triggers after-the-fact scrutiny or punishment, to other
modes of lawyer regulation.14 Before considering action in this realm
one might want to learn more about how financial insecurity actually
impacts individual lawyers' decision-making, how conduct in lower-
financial stakes matters compares with the cases we studied, and the
possible effectiveness of fines as sanctions.
III. IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW FIRMS AND
CLIENT ENTITIES
The most significant theme that runs throughout these papers is the
declining impact of the law firm entity as a determinant of its mem-
bers' conduct. Contrary to assertions concerning the power of firm
culture and bureaucracy in recent literature, t - our observers' papers
describe large law firms as loose, shifting, geographically dispersing
collections of autonomous individuals and specialized practice groups
with little overall firm control of individuals' conduct. While certain
functions such as hiring and financial management may be handled
the added beneficial effect of strengthening or reconstituting communities of lawyers
through continuous and future interactions. The creation of such ties could counter-
act tendencies to "defect" in future litigation gaming between fellow subgroup mem-
ber-opponents.
12. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7.
13. See id Rule 5.4(d); see also Michael J. Kelly, Lives of Lawyers: Journeys in
the Organizations of Practice (1994) (discussing the changes in professionalism and
legal ethics through a compilation of stories). Of course, another option, unlikely
though it may be, is for lawyers to lower their sights on profitability in service of other
goals, including the satisfaction of being in greater control of one's choices. See
Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 294-
300 (1993)
14. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L Rev. 799,
802-03 (1992) (discussing, in addition to traditional discipline, regulation via liability
in litigation, sanctions by courts or regulatory agencies, and legislative controls).
15. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 35-37; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 631-638 (1985).
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centrally, there is little intra-firm interaction. The firm's ethos is both
difficult to find and expressed in contradictory messages. In the ab-
sence of mentoring, the individual is often left to her own perceived
self-interest and moral code and, faced with this climate, looks to
rules-including those sanctioning the default norms of "tough" ad-
versariness-or outside reference groups for guidance in making
decisions. 16
This declining internal cohesion is accompanied by heightened ex-
ternal pressures exerted by clients and changes within the structures
of client entities. These pressures on law firms and their corporate
clients create new and growing challenges for those responsible for
managing such organizations. The questions raised would seem to
include:
1. How can large law firms create meaningful supervision systems in
the face of firm disaggregation, partner disinclination to supervise or
be supervised, and the overall pressure to "bill" rather than manage?
2. Traditional time-based billing arguably creates a fertile environ-
ment for over-lawyering and hyper-competition in areas such as re-
sisting discovery."7 Will client pressures for alternative non-hourly
billing and fixed litigation budgets have the opposite effect? Will the
resulting efficiency concerns enhance cooperation and reduce incen-
tives for "gaming"? Or will they lead to new, more efficient forms of
adversariness like nondisclosure of discoverable material without fil-
ing motions or objections, and further reduce the amount of internal
law firm discussion of tough calls?
3. How can firms create the reality-as opposed to the mere appear-
ance or reputation-of having safe, hospitable climates for discussion
of ethical and moral quandaries? In the discussion and resolution of
such dilemmas, how can the firm promote consideration of its organi-
zational interests when such interests are so difficult to discern? 8
4. Are corporate business managers-increasingly dealing through in-
house counsel-adequately trained to manage the process of litiga-
tion, the best use of outside counsel, the assessment of risk, and the
16. See Bart Victor & John B. Cullen, The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work
Climates, 33 Admin. Sci. Q. 101, 105-08 (1988) (discussing these as, respectively, the
individual and cosmopolitan locus of ethical analysis).
17. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44
Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1991) (analyzing the ethical issue posed by time-based billing).
It must be noted that our law firm informants, as opposed to judges and plaintiffs'
counsel, minimized the significance of this factor in discussing discovery abuse by de-
fense counsel.
18. In an early stage of this project, the idea was floated of "rating" law firms
annually for their integrity, ethical reputation, etc. In this era of rankings-mania this
might be promotive of greater sensitivity to the perception of being an ethical lawyer
or firm. On the other hand, given the assertion that clients seek "attack dogs" in
litigation as often as they seek to borrow a law firm's reputation for ethical conduct,
the effect of such a system is unclear.
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structure and process of decision making during all stages of high
stakes matters?
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATING LAWYERS
Given the observers' reports concerning eroding conditions under
which practitioners must make difficult ethical judgments, the role of
legal education takes on new significance. For example, the notion of
a continuum of training of lawyers which starts before law school and
continues throughout one's career may be more myth than reality. 9
Our observers note that: post-law school formal training is on the
wane,20 a victim of the economic squeeze on firm budgets and of client
unwillingness to invest in the training of lawyers; prolonged mentoring
at the inception of a career is largely a relic of the past, if it ever
existed; and the conditions for exercising reflective judgment in firms
are deteriorating. If these observations are valid, they suggest that the
opportunity to develop the ability to make sound ethical judgments
may end at the law school level.
The landscape of changing externalities, heightened business pres-
sure, mobile participants, and declining professional autonomy is not
limited to the legal profession. Rather, it may be symptomatic of a
larger societal phenomenon, the "big picture" which, as Carla Mes-
sikomer stresses in her essay, our lawyer-informants failed to see.2'
Given the narrow, lawyer-centric focus of education in most law
schools,22 one wonders whether, regardless of the level of the current
problem, future bar leaders will have a sufficiently broad perspective
to protect the law firm ethics equilibrium from the further onslaught
of societal change or make the changes necessary to protect the legal
profession from, much less lead it ahead of, the impact of these larger
trends.
19. The "MacCrate Report" urges greater law school teaching of skills and values
as part of a continuum of lawyer education in which law firms play a key role. See
Taskforce on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, American Bar
Ass'n, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum
(1992).
20. Moreover, as several lawyer-discussants noted, the nature of formal training
programs offered by law firms and CLE organizations is performance-oriented (how-
to-do-it; how to win), and focuses on public settings (e.g.. trial, deposition, negotia-
tion). It is thus not aimed at developing the kind of reflective judgment central to
steering an ethical course in the gray areas of choice.
21. Carla Messikomer, Ambivilance, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Ever'-
day Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 739. 766-69 (1998).
22. Law schools generally begin with intensive courses designed to train students
to "think like a lawyer," followed by upper-level courses taught in similar fashion.
Attempts to focus on other disciplines are usually limited to examinations of how
other fields impact the way law is made or administered. Few law schools focus on
the role of lawyers in relation to other professions or on the notions of professions in
society generally.
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The themes in our observers' papers suggest questions about the
state of the current operations of most law schools, including:
1. The Socratic mode of teaching and socialization, still prevalent in
the formative first year, which involves a process of rewarding the
most clever argument made in a competitive setting, with little re-
vealed of the teacher's own values or answers;23
2. The predominant mode of teaching legal ethics as another law sub-
ject in which, like the first-year Socratic socialization, most things are
arguable and the teacher does not practice law;
3. Offering its most contextualized method of teaching legal ethics-
real or simulated clinical experience under close supervision 24 -to
only a minority of students and then only rarely, if ever, in ways that
replicate the stakes of large firm, private practice, with strong clients,
firm economics and competition, and promotion/partnership incen-
tives and pressures;
4. Its almost exclusive focus on training students to learn the law or
develop law practice skills, without any serious effort to inculcate
broader notions of professions generally or the perspectives of other
disciplines on such cross-cutting themes as confidentiality, loyalty,
governance/regulation, and the economics of the profession;
5. The practice, especially by elite institutions which feed large firms,
of admitting the great majority of its students on the basis of academic
achievement alone, without regard for life experience or other per-
sonal criteria.
Potential solutions, too complex to explore here, include more collab-
orative learning, more clinical experience with inspirational mentors2 -
on behalf of clients who are neither poor nor sympathetic, more inter-
disciplinary and interprofessional approaches to law, and a reexamina-
tion of the kinds of individuals who gain admission to become future
lawyers. 26
This may represent the ultimate addressing of the situation "beyond
the rules." Here, too, interesting questions are posed. Can law school
23. See Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665,
734-735 (1994).
24. See, e.g., David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teach-
ing in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 64-87 (1995) (espousing a method of
instruction that combines classroom and clinical work).
25. But see Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education in The
Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 317 passim (David Luban ed.,
1983) (arguing that clinical education fares no better than traditional instruction in
producing moral reflection).
26. On a related note, to the extent that our study raised the problem of sub-
standard lawyering competency, it brings in to question the number of lawyers in
practice, the absence of meaningful controls to insure their ability to perform after the
bar examination, and the access to services issues that could emanate from elevating
competence standards or limiting the number of law graduates.
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teaching, no matter how intensive, affect students' moral develop-
ment? How lasting are classroom lessons in students' minds? What
standard of post-graduation competency is sufficient to maintain?
Would a significant conversion of the law school curriculum produce
significant differences in graduates' reflective qualities? Could such a
shift in pedagogy be justified on a cost-benefit basis?
V. DOING NOTHING
Finally, having speculated about a few possible responses to condi-
tions identified in this study, one must acknowledge the option of do-
ing nothing. Inaction could, of course, be justified on several grounds.
These grounds include: the notion that the complaints identified in
this study are little more than sentimentality over the bygone "Golden
Age" of the past when all was good;27 our observers' sense that the
system works pretty well and that most of our informants did not
seem overly unhappy with the status quo; or, as Carla Messikomer
notes, the notion that these problems are no different from, and actu-
ally may reflect, problems confronting the larger society.' More posi-
tively, they would include the sense that the market-driven changes
that are threatening professionalism are long-overdue reforms that
are in the consumer's, and thus the public's interest.29
On the other hand, to the extent that the public's perception of law-
yers in large firms, either directly or by association with their corpo-
rate clients, continues to diverge from the view from inside the
profession, the call for external regulation of lawyers through legisla-
tion, litigation, and even discipline may well increase." At a mini-
mum, this may pose an education or public relations challenge of
considerable proportions. More importantly, if, as reported here, law-
yers are experiencing a loss of autonomy and increased ambivalence
and moral dissonance via the reduction of their services to a commod-
ity for sale, this may, over time, begin to diminish the quality of appli-
cants to law school and to this segment of legal practice. That could
be the start of a greater long-term problem for the profession than any
arguable current "crisis."
27. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in lite Mist. The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia,
100 Dick. L. Rev. 549, 554-55 (1996).
28. See Messikomer, supra note 20, at 766-67.
29. See Galanter, supra note 26, at 561-62.
30. This may be more a function of the public's increased awareness and sensitiv-
ity to ethical issues than an erosion in the profession's behavior. See Steven N. Bren-
ner & Earl A. Molander, Is the Ethics of Business Changing?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-
Feb. 1977, at 57, 68 (discussing this in the business context).
19981
Notes & Observations
APPENDIX
PROBLEMS PRESENTED TO STUDY PARTICIPANTS*
MEMORANDUM
TO: Participants in "Ethics: Beyond the Rules"
The first of the following hypothetical problems is based on reports
about Bogle & Gates' representation of Fisons Corporation, a drug
company, in a recent lawsuit. The second problem is a highly fiction-
alized account of events in the working lives of large firm lawyers.
The third problem reflects excerpts from journalistic accounts of the
conduct of various lawyers in the Donovan, Leisure firm in the famed
Berkey Photo matter in the late 1970s. Our focus will be on the con-
duct of the associate, Fortenberry.
As you read these accounts, ask yourselves the following questions:
1. Are there problems and, if so, what are they?
2. How would the issues be resolved in your firm?
3. What are the pressures, incentives, and disincentives in large law
firms (and in the external environments in which large law firms
practice) that tend to produce behavior exhibited by the lawyers
in the Fisons cases in the first problem; by the hypothetical Ms.
Chen and Mr. Watson in the second problem; and by Forten-
berry in the third problem?
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM I**
Fisons Case Synopsis
On January 18, 1986, two-year-old Jennifer Pollack suffered seizures
caused by an extensive amount of theophylline in her system. The
seizures led to severe and permanent brain damage. Jennifer's par-
ents sued Dr. Kilcpera, the prescribing pediatrician, and Fisons Cor-
poration, the manufacturer of Somophyllin Oral Liquid, the
theophylline-based drug prescribed by Dr. Kilcpera for Jennifer. Dr.
Kilcpera cross-claimed against Fisons for damages and attorneys' fees,
pointing to Fisons' failure to warn that its theophylline-based medica-
tions were potentially dangerous when given to children with viral in-
fections. Fisons defended on the ground that it had disclosed all
known risks.
* Editor's note: This material is printed in its original form with minor
typographical edits. Reprinted by permission. © 1998 American Bar Association. All
rights reserved.
** This problem is based on the case of Washington State Physicians Insurance
Exchange & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993).
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In October 1986, Dr. Kilcpera's attorneys requested from Fisons
"copies of any letters sent by your company to physicians concerning
theophylline toxicity in children." Fisons responded: "Such letters, if
any, regarding Somophyllin Oral liquid will be produced at a reason-
able time and place convenient to Fisons and its counsel of record."
In November 1986, attorneys for the Pollacks sent an interrogatory
seeking the names of "all persons known to Fisons who have ex-
pressed their opinions or beliefs that the risks of harmful or serious
side effects outweigh the potential benefits of Somophyllin Oral Liq-
uid." Fisons responded: "Assuming proper medical supervision and
proper use of the product, none known."
In March 1987, Fisons' attorneys, Bogle & Gates, acquired actual
knowledge that documents responsive to the October 1986 request
from Dr. Kilcpera existed in Fisons' files for the drug Intal and that
such documents raised questions about the proper use of theophylline
with respect to pediatric asthmatics who contract viral infections.
In June 1987, lawyers for the Pollacks requested "all documents per-
taining to any warning letters including 'Dear Doctor Letters' or
warning correspondence to the medical professions regarding the use
of the drug Somophyllin Oral Liquid." Fisons responded: "Fisons ob-
jects to this request as overbroad in time and scope... without waiver
of these objections and subject to these limitations, Fisons will pro-
duce documents responsive to this request at plaintiff's expense at a
mutually agreeable time at Fisons' headquarters."
Also in June 1987, Pollack's attorneys requested: "all documents of
any clinical investigators who at any time stated or recommended to
Fisons that the use of the drug Somophyllin Oral Liquid might prove
dangerous." Fisons responded: "Without waiver of these objections
and subject to these limitations, Fisons will produce documents re-
sponsive to this interrogatory."
Fisons also had made general objections at various points to "all
discovery requests regarding products other than Somophyllin Oral
Liquid, as overly broad, unduly burdensome, harassing, and not rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
In an August 10, 1988, affidavit, filed in opposition to a motion to
compel, a Bogle & Gates attorney asserted that Fisons had agreed to
make available documents "reasonably related to the claims asserted
by plaintiffs." At this time, Fisons' attorneys were aware that docu-
ments raising questions about the "proper use" of theophylline-based
drugs were contained in Fisons' files related to Intal and would not be
produced.
Finally, in January 1989, after nearly three years of discovery, Dr.
Kilcpera settled with the Pollacks. More than a year later, in March
1990, the Pollacks' attorney received from an anonymous source a
copy of a letter dated June 30, 1981. The letter was from Fisons' man-
ager of marketing to 2000 selected physicians. Addressed "Dear Doc-
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tor" and entitled "Re: Theophylline and Viral Infections," the letter
warned that theophylline "can be a capricious drug" and stressed a
study showing "life-threatening theophylline toxicity when pediatric
asthmatics on previously well-tolerated doses of theophylline contract
viral infections."
The Pollacks' attorney forwarded this document to Dr. Kilcpera's
attorney, who then alerted the Court. The Pollacks and Dr. Kilcpera
argued that their discovery requests should have produced the letter
and moved for sanctions against Fisons and its counsel. A special
master was appointed, who denied the motion, but sua sponte ex-
panded the scope of discovery, thus requiring Fisons to deliver all re-
quested documents which related to theophylline, whether or not
contained in files related to Somophyllin Oral Liquid.
Among the 10,000 documents produced pursuant to the special
master's order was a July 1985 internal Fisons memo that began: "an
alarming trend seems to be surfacing in the medical literature, and as
a manufacturer of theophylline products, we need to be aware of it...
there has been a dramatic increase in reports of serious toxicity to
theophylline in 1985 medical journals." The memo warned that doc-
tors "may not be aware of this alarming increase in adverse reactions
such a seizures, permanent brain damage, and deaths," and called the
standard dosage "a significant mistake." The memo concluded that
the "epidemic of theophylline toxicity provides strong justification for
our corporate decision to cease promotional activities with regard to
the line of theophylline products."
Shortly after the documents were produced, Fisons settled with the
Pollacks for $6.9 million. Litigation then ensued about whether Bogle
& Gates should be sanctioned for its original discovery responses.
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM II
Hi-Tech Manufacturing Co. of Palo Alto, California, produces so-
phisticated lenses and optical equipment for a variety of scientific,
medical, industrial, and military applications. Hi-Tech has a small
sales force of its own. In addition, Hi-Tech has a "Re-Sale Agree-
ment" with Supplies Unlimited, Inc., a Maryland corporation with its
principal offices in Bethesda, Maryland.
The Re-Sale Agreement, signed October 1, 1990, provides that Sup-
plies Unlimited will act as distributor for Hi-Tech Manufacturing with
respect to sales of Hi-Tech's products to governments. Under the
Agreement, Supplies Unlimited purchases goods from Hi-Tech and
resells them at a mark-up to Government purchasers.
In February, 1992, the French Defense Ministry issued a Request
for Quotation for two million lenses of various types of military
applications.
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Mr. John Jones, President and CEO of Supplies Unlimited, dis-
cussed this 1992 French opportunity with Ms. Sally Sharp, Hi-Tech's
Vice-President of Sales. According to Ms. Sharp, Mr. Jones said that
Supplies Unlimited would not be able to handle financing for the po-
tential French business and therefore was not likely to submit a pro-
posal to the French Defense Ministry.
In June 1992, Ms. Sharp traveled to Paris and presented a written
quotation for direct sale by Hi-Tech of one million of the lenses cov-
ered by the French invitation to bid. In November 1992, Hi-Tech's bid
was accepted; the resultant sales contract produced $40,000,000 in
gross income to Hi-Tech.
In early 1993, Supplies Unlimited learned about Hi-Tech's direct
sale of one million lenses to the French Ministry of Defense. John
Jones, Supplies Unlimited's President, was angry. His demands to Hi-
Tech for a "commission" on that sale were rejected. His grievance
and several others boiled up into a lawsuit filed by Supplies Unlimited
against Hi-Tech in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. One of the several claims in the lawsuit was
that: (i) Supplies Unlimited was Hi-Tech's "exclusive" distributor
with respect to sales to governments; (ii) Supplies Unlimited was
ready, willing, and able to bid on the 1992 French Ministry of Defense
business and had in fact delivered a series of bids to the French
purchasing authorities; and (iii) Hi-Tech had violated the Distributor
Agreement by mailing the direct sale to France.
Hi-Tech's lawyers submitted interrogatories and a request for the
production of documents. One of the interrogatories asked for the
identification of "all documents related to the averments in
paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Complaint that Plaintiff was ready, willing
and, able to respond to the 1992 French request for quotations and
that Plaintiff submitted quotations to the French purchasing
authorities."
Supplies Unlimited was represented by the San Francisco firm of
Leland & Stanford. Partner Douglas Watson, assisted by associate
Paula Chen, did most of the work on the case for Supplies Unlimited.
Supplies Unlimited responded to Hi-Tech's interrogatories. The in-
terrogatory concerning the identification of documents related to the
averments of Complaint paragraphs 24 and 25 (related to the 1992
French business) was answered as follows:
The Following documents, inter alia, relate to the averments of
paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Complaint:
1. Letter from Paul Jones of Supplies Unlimited to M. Max Rich-
ard, French Ministry of Defense, dated September 12, 1992.
2. Letter from Paul Jones of Supplies Unlimited to M. Max Rich-
ard, French Ministry of Defense, dated September 16, 1992.
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3. Letter from Paul Jones of Supplies Unlimited to N1. Max Richard
of the French Ministry of Defense, dated September 22, 1992.
Supplies Unlimited's responses to Interrogatories were signed by John
Jones, President of Supplies Unlimited and by Ms. Chen, as counsel
for the company.
Documents produced by Supplies Unlimited included documents
numbered SU1022, SU1023 and SU1024, all appearing to be letters on
the letterhead of California Supplies, Inc., a wholly-owned, San Fran-
cisco-based subsidiary of Supplies Unlimited, signed by Paul Jones
and addressed to M. Max Richard at the French Ministry of Defense.
Each of these documents contained quotations for the sale of Hi-
Tech's lenses to the French Ministry of Defense.
Several months of pre-trial activity ensued. Counsel for Supplies
Unlimited took depositions of a few Hi-Tech personnel. Hi-Tech's
counsel noticed depositions of Mr. John Jones, Mr. Paul Jones, and
Mr. David Moore, the 27-year-old office manager of Supplies Unlim-
ited. Mr. Moore was thought by Hi-Tech to be the person with pri-
mary responsibility for maintaining Supplies Unlimited's files and for
transmitting communications to prospective ultimate purchasers.
Depositions were scheduled and rescheduled. Hi-Tech's lawyers in-
dicated that they wanted to take Mr. Moore's first. His deposition
was scheduled and then postponed (by Supplies Unlimited) three
times. By agreement, the deposition was to be held in Bethesda,
Maryland. Finally, the deposition day, a Friday, arrived.
On the evening before Mr. Moore's deposition, Ms. Chen met with
Mr. Moore in Bethesda to prepare him for the deposition. Late that
evening Mr. Moore told Ms. Chen that he was bothered by the fact
that some of the documents "are phony." Mr. Moore explained that
documents SU1022, SU1023, and SU1024 had been fabricated by
Messrs. John and Paul Jones of Supplies Unlimited after Hi-Tech had
served its document production request in 1994. Mr. Moore told Ms.
Chen that he later had been told about the alleged forgery operation.
Upon closer examination of the documents, Ms. Chen realized that
California Supplies, Inc., the California subsidiary on whose letter-
head the documents had been written, had not been incorporated un-
til July 1993, months after the purported dates of the letters; she was
unsure, however, whether Hi-Tech was, or even could have been,
aware of this discrepancy.
Ms. Chen immediately telephoned Mr. Watson but failed to reach
him because he was on the "red-eye" on his way to Maryland for the
next day's deposition. The next morning Ms. Chen met with Mr. Wat-
son and brought him up to date. Watson and Chen realized that both
John and Paul Jones were travelling in Asia and probably could not be
reached before the 10:00 a.m. deposition of Mr. Moore. Ms. Chen
suggested that they unilaterally postpone the Moore deposition, with-
out explanation, and that they then try to persuade their client to ac-
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cept an outstanding Hi-Tech settlement offer of $1,000,000, thus
ending the matter without any further discovery or exchanges of infor-
mation. Mr. Watson disagreed and said that the Moore deposition
should go forward, as scheduled.
Immediately before the deposition, Mr. Watson spoke with Mr.
Moore. Moore repeated the story he had told Ms. Chen. Mr. Watson
said, "Well, you will be under oath. We expect you will give truthful
responses." At 10:00 a.m., the deposition began. The "right" ques-
tions were asked. By noon, Mr. Moore had testified to his version of
the forged documents story, consistent with what he had told Ms.
Chen the night before and Mr. Watson that morning.
At 2:00 p.m., Hi-Tech's lawyer suspended the deposition and asked
for a stay of all other discovery for two weeks, in order to "absorb and
respond to the significance of Mr. Moore's testimony." Mr. Watson
agreed to the requested stay.
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM III***
Berkey Photo, Inc. began in the 1930s as a small photo-finishing
concern. It is still small, with 1977 sales of $203 million, compared to
Kodak's $6 billion. In the early Seventies, while the little Manhattan-
based company sought to develop products competitive with Kodak's,
the Rochester behemoth introduced a flurry of new cameras, films,
and photo finishing systems. According to Berkey and other Kodak
competitors, these new products were designed to be incompatible
with the products of Kodak's competitors.
Berkey came to view the situation as a case of monopoly power in
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In January 1973,
Berkey sued. The small company retained the Manhattan law firm of
Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpi to represent it, with the firm's sea-
soned litigator, Alvin M. Stein, as its chief trial counsel.
Old Ties with General Donovan
Kodak took a very different view of both the facts and the law. The
company's undisputed market success sprang not from predatory acts
designed to undercut competitors, but rather from an impressive his-
tory of technological innovation. Its new products had "brought qual-
ity, reliability, simplicity, and cost benefits to countless customers." In
Kodak's opinion, Berkey would have to go beyond market dominance
*** This problem was excerpted in the original study materials from Walter
Kiechel III, The Strange Case of Kodak's Lawyers, Fortune, May 8, 1978, at 188. It is
reprinted here by permission. © 1978 Time Inc. All rights reserved. The text in
italics is quoted from James B. Stewart, The Partners: Inside America's Most
Powerful Law Firms (1983). Editor's notes in the text are from the material given to
study participants.
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to show that the Rochester company had engaged in anti-competitive
behavior.
To counsel the company in this and other private antitrust actions
then pending against it, Kodak turned to Donovan Leisure. Their as-
sociation went back a long way, to the Forties when Kodak sought out
the help of General William Donovan and his partners in defending
an antitrust suit brought by the government. (Donovan, of OSS fame,
had founded the firm in 1929). Now in the early Seventies, the effort
required to prepare for the various suits promised to be Herculean.
[The case was assigned to John Doar who had] developed a reputa-
tion as one of the most upright public men of our time. In February
1975, he became a senior partner in the Donovan Leisure firm. He
was put in charge of Kodak's defense against Berkey and given re-
sponsibility for supervising twenty or so Donovan Leisure lawyers.
Berkey waived a jury from the outset, but Kodak insisted upon one.
Some observers of the litigation speculate that Kodak decided upon
the jury route after the case was assigned to Judge Marvin E. Frankel,
a renowned federal jurist thought by some to be a "liberal." Might
not this "liberal" judge incline to the side of Berkey in the little com-
pany's struggle with a corporate giant? What lawyers call "the better
view" is that Kodak simply thought that it had the kind of case that
would appeal to a jury's sympathies. As borne out in the opening and
closing statements, emphasis was to be placed on the notion that "you
can trust Kodak."
Enter Exhibit 666
Early in the Kodak case, 59-year-old senior partner Mahlon Perkins,
Jr. had been given the assignment of selecting and preparing Kodak's
expert witnesses. It was an assignment that appealed to the scholarly
side of Perkins' nature, and to assist him, he asked that associate Joseph
Fortenberry be assigned to work with him.
Some of Kodak's evidence came from the hand of Yale Professor
Merton J. Peck. Kodak commissioned Peck, a former chairman of the
Yale economics department and former member of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors, to serve as the company's principal
expert witness on economies. For a fee totaling $60,000 to $70,000, he
was to study the history of the photography industry and, it was
hoped, develop an expert opinion as to why Kodak's innovation had
been the cause of the company's market dominance. Berkey was go-
ing to argue that Kodak's acquisition of early competitors had also
been a factor in achieving its present market position. Such acquisi-
1. James B. Stewart, The Partners: Inside America's Most Powerful Law Firms
339 (1983).
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tions, a form of anti-competitive conduct, were the subject of a 1915
court decision against Kodak. A copy of this decision was furnished to
Peck.
On November 25, 1974, Professor Peck wrote the six-page, single
spaced letter that was ultimately to become Exhibit 666, the first of
two "smoking guns" at the trial. The letter responded to two ques-
tions posed to Peck by a Donovan Leisure partner, both questions in
effect asking how acquisition as covered in the 1915 decision could be
rejected as irrelevant to Kodak's present dominant position. At the
beginning of the letter, Peck confessed, "I am unconvinced I have as
yet a persuasive answer, to either question.. . ." Later, he was appar-
ently to find such answers, for at the trial he championed Kodak's
"innovation rather that acquisition" theory.
Peck's letter represents precisely the sort of document opposing
counsel hope to find in the course of discovery; an early wavering that
casts some doubt on the unassailability of what a witness subsequently
says upon the stand. In this instance, however, the letter was not pro-
duced in discovery, despite the formal request by Berkey's lawyers for
all of Peck's documents. At an April 1977 hearing on what evidence
should be discoverable, a magistrate ruled that Berkey should be fur-
nished all "interim reports" prepared by Peck and the commented
upon by Kodak counsel. As Judge Frankel stated when he finally saw
the document, "I will tell you, if I ever saw anything that looked like
an interim report, that's it . .. ."
But Mahlon Perkins, the Donovan Leisure partner responsible for
delivering the evidence, did not produce the letter. Apparently he
judged it to be part of Peck's correspondence that, as he told Berkey
counsel, would not be furnished because it did not constitute a report.
All of Peck's reports that were turned over dated from after March
1975. When Berkey's lawyers renewed the request for papers pre-
pared by Peck before them, whatever their status under the magis-
trate's ruling, Perkins told them that he would "take the matter under
advisement." He never got back to them, or they to him-the latter is
a point that Donovan Leisure now underlines. Yet Peck may have
lulled Berkey's counsel into making the mistake: before trial, he testi-
fied that he did not recall preparing any memoranda prior to April
1975.
The Suitcase Shuttle
The origins of the second "smoking gun" go back to July 1976, al-
most a year before the trial began. Someone had become apprehen-
sive about Peck's holding the materials he had reviewed in preparing
to testify. Peck claims it was the lawyers at Donovan Leisure who
were worried; Perkins maintains it was Peck himself. Whoever
originated the idea, Peck started shipping documents from New Ha-
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yen to the law firm. One shipment, packed in a suitcase that arrived
early in 1977, was to become the ruin of Mahlon Perkins.
The other shipments seem to have found their way into the discov-
ery process. The contents of that suitcase did not. On April 20, 1977,
Berkey's lawyer conducted a deposition of Professor Peck. Doar as-
signed Perkins and Fortenberry to the task of defending his deposition.
While it was a logical extension of his work in developing Peck's testi-
mony, Perkins was not looking forward to the deposition. As hard as
he had tried, Perkins had never delighted in this kind of tough litigating
tactics... that might be called for in the deposition by the opponents'
lead counsel of Kodak's single most important witness. But the need to
prove himself was weighing heavily on Perkins since Doar's arrival and
he went into the deposition determined to take a hard line.2
Upon finding that Peck had shipped documents to Donovan Lei-
sure, Stein asked Perkins what happened to the material. Perkins lied.
He told Stein that he had discarded the documents, thinking them to
be duplicates of material still available.
In fact, the suitcase and the materials it contained were travelling
back and forth between Perkins' Rockefeller Center office and his of-
fice downtown in the spaces Donovan Leisure had leased near the
courthouse for purposes of trial. Perkins knew of their existence, as
did at least two others in the law firm. At some point early on, For-
tenberry, acting on his own volition, brought the suitcase from down-
town to Perkins' uptown office. Later, a Donovan Leisure paralegal
inventoried the contents.
Fortenberry was seated next to the senior partner at the deposition
where Perkins first lied. When Perkins announced that he had dis-
carded the shipped materials, the associate whispered in Perkins' ear
that he had forgotten the suitcase. Perkins ignored him.
The contents of the suitcase remained hidden in a cupboard in Per-
kins' uptown office until the final days of the trial. He now maintains
that, during the entire period, he never examined the documents. The
bitter irony is that, as it later came out, the material contained nothing
particularly damaging to Kodak. The contents of the suitcase became
"smoking gun No. 2," not because of anything revealed in the docu-
ments, but rather because their mere existence indicated that Perkins
had lied under oath.
[Ed. Note: Fortenberry did nothing further concerning the suitcase
or Perkins' lie. Two weeks after the deposition, Perkins prepared an
affidavit repeating the substance of his deposition statement con-
cerning what had happened to the suitcase.]
2. Stewart, supra note 1, at 340.
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Where Was Doar?
What was Doar doing while his partner was handling the evidence?
* * * He was troubled by Perkins' statement that the material re-
turned by Peck had been destroyed. When Perkins submitted to Doar
a preliminary draft of the affidavit attesting to the destruction, Doar
told his partner that its language was not strong enough, that it would
not satisfy the judge. Perkins beefed up the affidavit, Doar conducted
no further investigation, and there the matter rested for the remainder
of 1977, a time bomb waiting to explode. One of the maxims of lead-
ership in complex, drawn-out litigation is "you have to delegate." The
conventional wisdom in the Wall Street legal community also holds
that "you've got to trust your partner."
[Ed. Note: The trial proceeded through both sides' case to the testi-
mony of Professor Peck. In his cross examination, Peck revealed
that he had written a report in letter form (Exhibit 666) that pre-
dated April 1975. It was a document that Perkins had not produced
in discovery and which Doar had continued to conceal during trial.
When now produced at trial it became "smoking gun No. 1," hurt-
ing Kodak's case in the jury's eyes.]
Doar worked through the weekend in formal sessions with the
judge and with Berkey counsel to prepare the case to be sent to the
jury the following week. Sunday evening Doar returned from the
courthouse to his office. Mahlon Perkins came in and closed the door
behind him. Visibly upset, Perkins proceeded to tell Doar that he
hadn't destroyed any documents after all. Perkins couldn't give a very
good account of his conduct, other than to say that once he had lied,
he couldn't undo it .... [Doar] advised Perkins that he should retain a
lawyer, and called ... the firm's executive committee to report what
Perkins had confessed. Led to the suitcase documents by Perkins,
Doar confiscated them and established a security system to be sure
none would be mislaid. Doar then spent most of the night indexing
and inventorying the material in preparation for turning it over to
Berkey in the morning. He advised Kodak's general counsel, Kendall
Cole, who couldn't believe what had happened. At 6:45 the next
morning, Doar telephoned Stein with the news. By 8:30 the docu-
ments, in two boxes, were in the courtroom ready for Stein's
inspection.
Summing up their cases on Wednesday and Thursday, both sides
alluded to the dramatic events of the preceding days. Doar spoke
only of the uncovering of the suitcase documents-"an unfortunate
circumstance, an uncontradicted circumstance, a simply incredible
circumstance."
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[Ed. Note: Berkey was awarded $113 million by the jury. Kodak
had apparently been harmed by appearing to have tried to conceal
documents. Donovan Leisure was fired by Kodak. After the ver-
dict was overturned on appeal, Kodak settled the matter for $6.75
million.]
Notes & Observations
